

58. Learning programmes should be flexible, allowing pension board members to update particular areas of learning where required and to acquire new areas of knowledge in the event of any change. For example, pension board members who take on new responsibilities will need to ensure that they gain appropriate knowledge and understanding relevant to carrying out those new responsibilities.
59. The regulator will provide an e-learning programme to help meet the needs of pension board members, whether or not they have access to other learning. If schemes choose alternative learning programmes they should be confident that those programmes:
- cover the type and degree of knowledge and understanding required
 - reflect the legal requirements, and
 - are delivered within an appropriate timescale.

Demonstrating knowledge and understanding

60. Schemes should keep appropriate records of the learning activities of individual pension board members and the board as a whole. This will help pension board members to demonstrate steps they have taken to comply with legal requirements and how they have mitigated risks associated with knowledge gaps. A good external learning programme will maintain records of the learning activities of individuals on the programme or of group activities, if these have taken place.

Conflicts of interest and representation

Legal requirements

61. A conflict of interest is a financial or other interest which is likely to prejudice a person's exercise of functions as a member of the pension board. It does not include a financial or other interest arising merely by virtue of that person being a member of the scheme or any connected scheme for which the board is established³².
62. In relation to the pension board, scheme regulations must include provision requiring the scheme manager to be satisfied:
- that a person to be appointed as a member of the pension board does not have a conflict of interest and
 - from time to time, that none of the members of the pension board has a conflict of interest³³.

32
Section 5(5) of the 2013 Act defines a conflict of interest in relation to pension board members and s7(5) of that Act in relation to scheme advisory board members.

33
Section 5(4)(a), *ibid.*

63. Scheme regulations must require each member or proposed member of a pension board to provide the scheme manager with such information as the scheme manager reasonably requires for the purposes of meeting the requirements referred to above³⁴.
64. Scheme regulations must include provision requiring the pension board to include employer representatives and member representatives in equal numbers³⁵.
65. In relation to the scheme advisory board, the regulations must also include provision requiring the responsible authority to be satisfied:
 - that a person to be appointed as a member of the scheme advisory board does not have a conflict of interest and
 - from time to time, that none of the members of the scheme advisory board has a conflict of interest³⁶.
66. Scheme regulations must require each member of a scheme advisory board to provide the responsible authority with such information as the responsible authority reasonably requires for the purposes of meeting the requirements referred to above³⁷.

Practical guidance

67. This guidance is to help scheme managers to meet the legal requirement to be satisfied that pension board members do not have any conflicts of interest. The same requirements apply to responsible authorities in relation to scheme advisory boards, (apart from the requirement regarding employer and member representatives), but the regulator does not have specific responsibility for oversight of scheme advisory boards.
68. Actual conflicts of interest are prohibited by the 2013 Act and cannot, therefore, be managed. Only potential conflicts of interest can be managed.
69. A conflict of interest may arise when pension board members:
 - must fulfil their statutory role³⁸ of assisting the scheme manager in securing compliance with the scheme regulations, other legislation relating to the governance and administration of the scheme and any requirements imposed by the regulator or with any other matter for which they are responsible, whilst
 - having a separate personal interest (financial or otherwise), the nature of which gives rise to a possible conflict with their statutory role.

34
Section 5(4)(b) of the
2013 Act.

35
Section 5(4)(c), *ibid.*

36
Section 7(4)(a), *ibid.*

37
Section 7(4)(b), *ibid.*

38
Section 5(2), *ibid.*

70. Some, if not all, of the 'Seven principles of public life' (formerly known as the 'Nolan principles')³⁹ will already apply to people carrying out roles in public service pension schemes, for example through the Ministerial code, Civil Service code or other codes of conduct. These principles should be applied to all pension board members in the exercise of their functions as they require the highest standards of conduct. Schemes should incorporate the principles into any codes of conduct (and across their policies and processes) and other internal standards for pension boards.
71. Other legal requirements relating to conflicts of interest may apply to pension board members and/or scheme advisory board members⁴⁰. The regulator may not have specific responsibility for enforcing all such legal requirements, but it does have a particular role in relation to pension board members and conflicts of interest. While pension board members may be subject to other legal requirements, when exercising functions as a member of a pension board they must meet the specific requirements of the 2013 Act and are expected to satisfy the standards of conduct and practice set out in this code.
72. It is likely that some pension board members will have dual interests, which may include other responsibilities. Scheme managers and pension board members will need to consider all other interests, financial or otherwise, when considering interests which may give rise to a potential or actual conflict. For example, a finance officer appointed as a pension board member can offer their knowledge and make substantial contributions to the operational effectiveness of the scheme, but from time to time they may be involved in a decision or matter which may be, or appear to be, in opposition to another interest. For instance, the pension board may be required to take or scrutinise a decision which involves the use of departmental resources to improve scheme administration, while the finance officer is at the same time tasked, by virtue of their employment, with reducing departmental spending. A finance officer might not be prevented from being a member of a pension board, but the scheme manager must be satisfied that their dual interests are not likely to prejudice the pension board member in the exercise of any particular function.

39
The Committee on Standards in Public Life has set out seven principles of public life which apply to anyone who works as a public office holder or in other sectors delivering public services:
www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-7-principles-of-public-life.

40
For example, local government legislation applicable to English local authorities contains legal requirements relating to certain people about standards of conduct, conflicts of interest and disclosure of certain interests.

73. Scheme regulations will set out matters for which the pension board is responsible⁴¹. Schemes⁴² should set out clear guidance on the roles, responsibilities and duties of pension boards and the members of those boards in scheme documentation. This should cover, for example, whether they have responsibility for administering or monitoring the administration of the scheme; developing, delivering or overseeing compliance with requirements for governance and/or administration policies; and taking or scrutinising decisions relating to governance and/or administration. Regardless of their remit, potential conflicts of interest affecting pension board members need to be identified, monitored and managed effectively.
74. Schemes should consider potential conflicts of interest in relation to the full scope of roles, responsibilities and duties of pension board members. It is recommended that all those involved in the management or administration of public service pension schemes take professional legal advice when considering issues to do with conflicts of interest.

A three-stage approach to managing potential conflicts of interest

75. Conflicts of interest can inhibit open discussions and result in decisions, actions or inactions which could lead to ineffective governance and administration of the scheme. They may result in pension boards acting improperly, or lead to a perception that they have acted improperly. It is therefore essential that any interests, which have the potential to become conflicts of interest or be perceived as conflicts of interest, are identified and that potential conflicts of interest (including perceived conflicts) are monitored and managed effectively.
76. Schemes should ensure that there is an agreed and documented conflicts policy and procedure, which includes identifying, monitoring and managing potential conflicts of interest. They should keep this under regular review. Policies and procedures should include examples of scenarios giving rise to conflicts of interest, how a conflict might arise specifically in relation to a pension board member and the process that pension board members and scheme managers should follow to address a situation where board members are subject to a potential or actual conflict of interest.

41
Section 5(2) of the 2013 Act.

42
See paragraph 25 for the definition of 'schemes'.

77. Broadly, schemes should consider potential conflicts of interest in three stages:
- identifying
 - monitoring, and
 - managing.

Identifying potential conflicts

78. Schemes should cultivate a culture of openness and transparency. They should recognise the need for continual consideration of potential conflicts. Disclosure of interests which have the potential to become conflicts of interest should not be ignored. Pension board members should have a clear understanding of their role and the circumstances in which they may find themselves in a position of conflict of interest. They should know how to manage potential conflicts.
79. Pension board members, and people who are proposed to be appointed to a pension board, must provide scheme managers with information that they reasonably require to be satisfied that pension board members and proposed members do not have a conflict of interest⁴³.
80. Schemes should ensure that pension board members are appointed under procedures that require them to disclose any interests, including other responsibilities, which could become conflicts of interest and which may adversely affect their suitability for the role, before they are appointed.
81. All terms of engagement, for example appointment letters, should include a clause requiring disclosure of all interests, including any other responsibilities, which have the potential to become conflicts of interest, as soon as they arise. All interests disclosed should be recorded. See the section of this code on 'Monitoring potential conflicts'.
82. Schemes should take time to consider what important matters or decisions are likely to be considered during, for example, the year ahead and identify and consider any potential or actual conflicts of interest that may arise in the future. Pension board members should be notified as soon as practically possible and mitigations should be put in place to prevent these conflicts from materialising.

43
Section 5(4)(b) of the
2013 Act and scheme
regulations.

Monitoring potential conflicts

83. As part of their risk assessment process, schemes should identify, evaluate and manage dual interests which have the potential to become conflicts of interest and pose a risk to the scheme and possibly members, if they are not mitigated. Schemes should evaluate the nature of any dual interests and assess the likely consequences were a conflict of interest to materialise.
84. A register of interests should provide a simple and effective means of recording and monitoring dual interests and responsibilities. Schemes should also capture decisions about how to manage potential conflicts of interest in their risk registers or elsewhere. The register of interests and other relevant documents should be circulated to the pension board for ongoing review and published, for example on a scheme's website.
85. Conflicts of interest should be included as an opening agenda item at board meetings and revisited during the meeting, where necessary. This provides an opportunity for those present to declare any interests, including other responsibilities, which have the potential to become conflicts of interest, and to minute discussions about how they will be managed to prevent an actual conflict arising.

Managing potential conflicts

86. Schemes should establish and operate procedures which ensure that pension boards are not compromised by potentially conflicted members. They should consider and determine the roles and responsibilities of pension boards and individual board members carefully to ensure that conflicts of interest do not arise, nor are perceived to have arisen.
87. A perceived conflict of interest can be as damaging to the reputation of a scheme as an actual conflict of interest. It could result in scheme members and interested parties losing confidence in the way a scheme is governed and administered. Schemes should be open and transparent about the way they manage potential conflicts of interest.
88. When seeking to prevent a potential conflict of interest becoming detrimental to the conduct or decisions of the pension board, schemes should consider obtaining professional legal advice when assessing any option.

Examples of conflicts of interest

89. Below are some examples of potential or actual conflicts of interest which could arise, or be perceived to arise, in relation to public service pension schemes. These will depend on the precise role, responsibilities and duties of a pension board. The examples provided are for illustrative purposes only and are not exhaustive. They should not be relied upon as a substitute for the exercise of judgement based on the principles set out in this code and any legal advice considered appropriate, on a case-by-case basis.

a. Investing to improve scheme administration versus saving money

An employer representative, who may be a Permanent Secretary, finance officer or local councillor, is aware that system X would help to improve standards of record-keeping in the scheme, but it would be costly to implement. The scheme manager, for instance a central government department or local administering authority, would need to meet the costs of the new system at a time when there is internal and external pressure to keep costs down. In order to meet the costs of the new system, the scheme manager would need to find money, perhaps by using a budget that was intended for another purpose. This decision could prove unpopular with taxpayers. A conflict of interest could arise where the employer representative was likely to be prejudiced in the exercise of their functions by virtue of their dual interests.

b. Outsourcing an activity versus keeping an activity in-house

In an extension of the previous example, a member representative, who is also an employee of a participating employer, is aware that system X would help to improve standards of record-keeping in the scheme, but it would mean outsourcing an activity that is currently being undertaken in-house by their employer. The member representative could be conflicted if they were likely to be prejudiced in the exercise of their functions by virtue of their employment.

c. Representing the breadth of employers or membership versus representing narrow interests

An employer representative who happens to be employed by the administering authority and is appointed to the pension board to represent employers generally could be conflicted if they only serve to act in the interests of the administering authority, rather than those of all participating employers. Equally, a member representative, who is also a trade union representative, appointed to the pension board to represent the entire scheme membership could be conflicted if they only act in the interests of their union and union membership, rather than all scheme members.

d. Assisting the scheme manager versus furthering personal interests

- i. A pension board member, who is also a scheme adviser, may recommend the services or products of a related party, for which they might derive some form of benefit, resulting in them not providing, or not being seen to provide, independent advice or services
- ii. A pension board member who is involved in procuring or tendering for services for a scheme administrator, and who can influence the award of a contract, may be conflicted where they have an interest in a particular supplier, for example, a family member works there.

e) Sharing information with the pension board versus a duty of confidentiality to an employer

An employer representative has access to information by virtue of their employment, which could influence or inform the considerations or decisions of the pension board. They have to consider whether to share this information with the pension board in light of their duty of confidentiality to their employer. Their knowledge of this information will put them in a position of conflict if it is likely to prejudice their ability to carry out their functions as a member of the pension board.

Representation on pension boards

90. While scheme regulations must require pension boards to have an equal number of employer and member representatives⁴⁴, there is flexibility to design arrangements which best suit each scheme.
91. Arrangements should be designed with regard to the principles of proportionality, fairness and transparency, and with the aim of ensuring that a pension board has the right balance of skills, experience and representation (for example, of membership categories and categories of employers participating in the scheme). Those responsible for appointing members to a pension board should also consider the mix of skills and experience needed on the pension board in order for the board to operate effectively in light of its particular role, responsibilities and duties.

44
Section 5(4)(c) of the
2013 Act.